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Mr. Behm refers also to a very instructive paper, by H. G. Good, of Bluffton College, Bluffton, Ohio, in *School and Society* 3.825-827 (June 3, 1916). Two quotations from this article (page 827) follow:

Would it be ungracious to say that our author after more or less brusquely bowing out at the front door our old acquaintance Formal Discipline <so far as current Schools are concerned> has then surreptitiously readmitted him at the back <in connection with the "Modern School">? . . .

Will a child trained in that school "read for sheer fun" at any time "Homer, Chaucer, Shakespeare" and the rest? May not the modernization of the curriculum go too far; and is it safe to assume that the past, even the remote past, has nothing further to teach us? Is there any evidence that pupils get more "orderly training" from realistic subjects than from the study of Latin; and is inability to read a Latin historical document conclusive evidence of the futility of "four years of Latin"?

To Professor Shorey's fine paper, *The Assault on Humanism* (*THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 11.48) Mr. Behm of course refers repeatedly.

Here, then, are several papers that deserve careful study by all who are interested in Dr. Flexner's views, and in the 'experiment' based thereon. I have thought all along that it is fortunate that this 'experiment' is being tried outside the Public School systems of the country; it seemed to me far more likely that, under such circumstances, the 'experiment' would be fully and freely criticized. Such has indeed been the case. Teachers within the Public School systems are much more likely to speak freely of Dr. Flexner's Modern School than, let us say, Public School teachers in a city where the Gary System is being tried are to speak, in adverse public discussion, at least, of that system.

C. K.

(*To be continued*)

THE REACTION OF SPAIN UPON ROME

(*Concluded from page 5*)

More important, perhaps, were the changes in the political life of Rome which may be traced to the acquisition of Spain. One of the most striking reversals in the political history of Rome was the substitution of Assembly for Senate control in matters of foreign policy and imperial administration. The underlying reason for this decline of Senatorial authority, namely, the inefficiency of that body and of its deputies in the provinces, has long been attributed to its actions in connection with the war against Jugurtha. In my opinion, the Jugurthan fiasco was the second act of this drama. The first act was staged in Spain during the Celtiberian war, 153-133 B. C.

This opinion was shared by Polybius, who continued his work from 168 B. C. to 146 B. C. in order to describe the evil uses to which Rome had turned her fortune. Calpurnius Piso places the beginnings of the downfall of Rome in the censorship of Marcus Messala and Caius

Cassius, 154 B. C. Florus⁶ says, with reference to the fall of Numantia,

Hactenus populus Romanus pulcher, egregius, pius, sanctus atque magnificus; reliqua saeculi ut grandia aequae, ita vel magis turbida et foeda, crescentibus cum ipsa magnitudine imperii vitiis.

It is true that many authors take 146 B. C. and the destruction of Carthage as the year and the event which marked the turning-point of Rome's imperial career. Among them might be mentioned Sallust, Velleius, Valerius Maximus, Orosius, and even Florus⁷, who apparently strove to be impartial by giving every possible date a hearing. The chief reason given for the choice of 146 is that a wholesome restraint upon the Roman people had been removed by the destruction of Carthage. This does not take into account the fact that the Celtiberian war was not ended until thirteen years after that date; nor is there any definite proof that the Romans looked upon Carthage as a possible military rival. The figs which Cato exhibited were not thought of as munitions for Punic catapults. They represented, rather, wealth, and wealth which Rome could not acquire save by annihilating the owners thereof. I am inclined to doubt the moral and wholesome effectiveness of fear, but, if fear were needed to keep the Romans in the straight and narrow path, to the revolting tribes in Spain and not to the Carthaginians must be given the credit for restraining the Romans. It was necessary to resort to conscription to fill the levies for Spanish service in 152. Desertion and a certain modest backwardness about enlisting are to be noted on other occasions. But the most striking testimony comes from Cicero, who writes (*De Officiis* 1.38):

Sic cum Celtiberis, cum Cimbris bellum ut cum inimicis gerebatur, uter esset, non uter imperaret, cum Latinis, Sabinis, Samnitibus, Poenis, Pyrrho de imperio dimicabatur.

Returning to my statement that the war in Spain demonstrated for the first time on a broad scale the inefficiency of the Senate, let me note first of all the military weaknesses there displayed. Our chief source of information concerning this conflict is Appian's account of the Spanish War. Modern critics have accepted his account only in so far as it gives a general picture of the events which he is describing. The inaccuracy of his details has been proved in many instances. Therefore I present the following statistics with a great deal of reservation, submitting them merely as indications of the general course of the war. Appian often describes a defeat with such statements as 'many were killed', 'most of them perished', 'Plautius was defeated with great slaughter'. According to the figures given by Appian, generally in round numbers, the total loss for the first thirteen years of the war is 45,000. There were ten defeats in general engage-

⁶Flor. 1. 34.

⁷Sallust, *Cat.* 10; *Jug.* 41; *Hist.* 1. 11; Velleius 2. 1; Valerius Maximus 7.2-3; Orosius 5. 8. 2; Florus 1. 47. 2.

ments, many more defeats in which only a portion of the Roman armies was engaged. Three Roman commanders were forced to make treaties in which they recognized the independence of the rebels, in order to save their armies from certain destruction. On the whole, the impression left by a perusal of all the accounts is not conducive to praise of Roman military genius. One may note in conclusion that the destruction of Numantia, defended by 8,000 fighting men, was accomplished by an army of 60,000, which never once accepted the offer of battle but was contented with starving the citizens into submission.

It was not only upon the field of battle that the Roman generals were inefficient and unsuccessful. On four occasions the Romans suffered from famine and from cold⁸. Mutiny was avoided by laxity of discipline. Commanders waged war upon unoffending peoples, plundered tribes which were friendly, and committed horrible crimes against those who surrendered. In many cases these acts were directly contrary to the orders of the Senate, but in only two instances are punishments recorded. The consul Aemilius Lepidus was fined for raiding the Vaccae against the express orders of the Senate, and the consul Hostilius Mancinus was handed over to the Numantini for punishment because he had concluded a peace on terms considered disgraceful to the Roman people. The most important features, then, of these campaigns are the failure of the Roman commanders upon the battlefield, their inability to care for the physical welfare of the troops entrusted to them, their indifference to that which was honorable, and the failure of the Senate to control or to punish its representatives. I do not wish it thought that I believe all these weaknesses to be a direct result of contact with the barbarians of the West. Such is the opinion of Professor Tenney Frank⁹, who overemphasizes the demoralizing effect of environment. My purpose in the presentation of the facts given above is to show that, in the presence of an active and courageous enemy, the real weakness of Senatorial imperialism was unmistakably demonstrated.

For the effects upon Rome of this exhibition of military, political, and moral decline, one must turn to Rome itself. It is true that it was in the camps before Numantia that Jugurtha heard that everyone in Rome had his price. But the real proof of that gossip was to be found in Rome, where the first permanent court was established in 149 B. C. in an attempt to curb the greed of the Roman commanders. Much more important, however, and more accurately foretelling the political future of the Roman State were the legislative attempts of the Senate to govern this troublesome territory. In 171 B. C. the Lex Baebia increased the tenure of office of the praetors in Spain to two years. It was discovered that poor generals could do twice as much harm in two years as in one; therefore that experiment was quickly dropped. In 152 M. Marcellus was reelected to the

consulship, after a brief two-year interval, because he was the only available commander for the Spanish campaign. This was a terrible shock to Senatorial jealousy and almost immediately a law was passed forbidding reelection to the consulate. Sixteen years later, in 135, this law had to be broken when Scipio Africanus Minor was reelected. The customary distribution of the provinces also gave way, and Hither Spain was assigned to Scipio by a *plebiscitum*. These exceptions to customs and to laws did not weaken the Senate's love of power, nor did they teach that body any lessons of prudence. But they must have opened the eyes of the Opposition to the manifest weakness of the oligarchy in power.

The effect of the wars in Spain upon the populace of Rome was twofold. In the first place the hardships of the campaigns led to complaint and out of this complaint grew opposition to Senatorial rule. The first quarrel arose in connection with the levy for the year 151. Neither troops nor minor officers would volunteer in sufficient numbers. Attempts by the consuls to use force resulted in their arrest by the tribunes. The compromise to which both parties consented, enrollment by lot, was in reality a democratic victory. It was not a permanent victory, however, for the same complaints and the same actions were repeated in 138. On the other hand, the people asserted their share in government much more successfully when they began in this period to enact a series of *plebiscita* dealing with provincial administration. For Scipio Africanus Minor was assigned to Spain by a law of the people, and, when the Senate refused him men and money, the popular assembly gave him the power to enlist volunteers, allowing him also the privilege of paying them out of his own purse.

The last century of the Republic, with its kaleidoscopic changes, was guided by the genius or by the incompetence of individuals. Therefore the reaction of Spain upon Rome may be traced through these individuals and their programs of reform. The attempts of Tiberius Gracchus to increase the number of men liable to military service were made to offset the severe losses of the Celtiberian war. The career of the Younger Scipio in Spain brought him little honor, but it served as a model for more daring successors.

A study of Scipio's activities in Spain has been made by Schulten (Numantia, 272-274), with special reference to what he calls the future monarchy. The facts do not show Spanish reaction. I give them simply because they relate to Spain, although they do so only by accident. In the first place, Scipio served as legate in Spain for the years 151-150, and won a reputation for fearlessness and honesty. From that time on his power in Roman politics grew. After the destruction of Carthage he assumed almost dictatorial management of the Spanish campaigns. Among those who commanded Roman armies in Spain were Fabius Maximus, Scipio's brother, Servilianus, adopted brother of Fabius, Caepio, the brother of Servilianus, Furius Philo, Scipio's

⁸Appian, *Iberica* 47, 54, 78, 82.

⁹Roman Imperialism, 230-233.

intimate friend, the faithful Laelius, Fannius, the son-in-law of Laelius, and Tiberius Gracchus, Scipio's nephew. When his appointees had failed and Scipio himself assumed command, his superiority to law and custom almost equalled that of Caesar. He was elected in spite of the law which forbade reelection to the consulship; he was assigned to Spain without recourse to lot; he chose a small army which looked to him for orders and for pay; he was allowed a personal bodyguard; a brother and a cousin served as legati; a nephew was quaestor. I think that we may agree with Schulten that Scipio, not Caius Gracchus, was the forerunner of Caesar.

The democratization of the army by Marius was the result of new losses and a new enemy, but some of the disciplinary measures enforced at Massilia take us back to the days of Marius's first military experience, when he served under Scipio at Numantia. In 83 began the war of Sertorius. It marked a new epoch in the history of Rome, being the first contest in which a Roman leader conducted a civil war using a Roman province as a base. In 65 B. C., Cn. Calpurnius Piso was sent to Spain as quaestor pro praetore, with the evident purpose of establishing there a military base for the Catilinarian conspirators. The interest in the Two Spains and the importance attached to those provinces by Pompey and Caesar—at least from a military point of view—indicated that the peninsula was not forgotten in this second civil war.

Under the wise rule inaugurated by Julius Caesar after the battle of Munda, the feeling that Spain was an integral part of the Roman Empire spread rapidly. Individuals and small groups had received the rights of Roman citizenship, but the extension of these privileges, in full or in part, by Caesar to more than thirty communities mark him as the first great romanizer of Spain. Opportunity was thereby given to natives of Spain to exert some influence in the political arena of Rome.

The first Spanish native to appear in Roman politics was Quintus Varius. As a tribune of the plebs in 90 B. C. he achieved notoriety rather than fame. Fortunately for Rome his successors were of a different mould. The elder Balbus, a native of Gades, enfranchised by Pompey at Caesar's request, was the first non-Italian consul of Rome. His son was the only provincial to be honored with a triumph. Seneca, Trajan, Hadrian, Marcus Aurelius, and Theodosius are names which indicate the power of Spain in the defense and the administration of the Empire.

The economic importance of the Spanish provinces was by no means great at the beginning of the Roman conquest. The policies which had led to the expansion of Rome to the West had been distinctly military. Still, the wealth which Phoenicians, Greeks, and Carthaginians had obtained from their operations in Spain was not unknown to the Romans. It was natural, too, that Roman officials should attempt by fair means or foul to make the newly acquired territory pay for the expenses and the efforts of the conquerors.

The country, however, was in a condition far from prosperous, and the series of wars at the close of the third century had not only robbed Spain of her portable wealth but also put an end to steady industrial production. The Roman conquest also brought with it a new master and new commercial relationships. The readjustment thus enforced was felt most keenly, no doubt, by the traders of Carthago Nova, Gades, and the other Carthaginian settlements, men whose knowledge and acquaintanceship were confined to a business world of which Rome was not a part.

The statement of authorities both ancient and modern that the Two Spains were expensive acquisitions is undoubtedly true, but the blame should be placed in Rome, not in Spain. There were a few attempts at reasonable exploitation of the resources of the country, for example the reopening of the iron and silver mines of the Hither Province by Cato, in 197. The amount of booty brought back by conquering generals was by no means small, and it is a well known fact that Caesar made two fortunes during his governorship of the Farther Province. It may be noted that Caesar received the thanks of the provincials for the polite way in which he despoiled them.

With the establishment of peace by Augustus, the multiplication of great highways, and the equitable administration of the early Principate, Spain became one of the most important commercial units of the Empire. It was much more than a recruiting ground for the Roman army. I shall not trouble you with a list of its exports from mines, farms, pastures, orchards, vineyards, rivers, and seas, nor shall I enumerate the host of manufactured products which found their way to the city on the Tiber. You have no doubt found them in the works of travellers and of loyal native writers. A few of the conclusions of Parvan, however, may be of interest. In a study based largely upon epigraphical evidence he noted the predominance of Spanish traders in Spain throughout the Imperial period. The Latin or Italian element reached its high water mark about the middle of the first century B. C. By the time of Trajan, Italians were outnumbered by local dealers. The direction of Spanish trade may be noted by inscriptions of Spaniards in foreign ports. Ostia, Verona, Nemausus, Burdigala are the only cities cited. On the other hand, there was open competition in Spain. This is proved by the presence of traders of all nationalities. Finally, it has been shown by others than Parvan that most of the amphorae found in the Mons Testacio were of Spanish origin, practically all of them coming from Baetica.

The cultural influences of Spain and Spanish writers upon Rome are too well known to be passed over in silence. In art and in language the Spanish people were pupils, taking all and giving little, if anything, in return. On the other hand, the enthusiasm which the natives of Spain have always displayed in matters of religion was given to the Imperial cult. Even here, however, the initiative, which I think should be

attributed to the devotees, simply strengthened an institution of the Roman State without altering it in any way. In the development of the Christian Church Spanish influence did play an important part. The one trifle which occurs to me as interesting and perhaps unknown to you is a compromise between Christianity and paganism to be found in the report of a Council of Elvira. It was decided that a Christian might become a duovir and perform the pagan duties incumbent upon such an official without losing his membership in the Church. The only restriction was that during his year of office the unfortunate man should be deprived of access to the buildings or participation in the sacraments of the Church. It is to literature that we must turn to find a decided reaction of the pupil upon the teacher. Spain, the land of the Golden West, had held a high position in the literature of Greece as well as that of Rome. But a list of names, among them M. Porcius Latro, Hyginus, the two Senecas, Lucan, Pomponius Mela, Columella, Quintilian, Martial, Prudentius, Orosius, incomplete as it is, will indicate the indebtedness of Rome to the men of Spain. To what extent these writers brought to Roman literature characteristics peculiar to Spain, I shall not attempt to state. But that they guided an important division of Roman culture while they flourished is, I believe, beyond question.

In conclusion I wish to state my belief that the people of Spain played much more than a passive rôle in the drama of Roman history. For two centuries Roman wealth and Roman lives were sacrificed that this Western land might be made a part of Rome's Empire. If Spanish opposition was responsible to a great extent for the downfall of the Republican system, Spanish support was equally responsible for the success of the first two centuries of the Principate. It is a far call from Viriathus to Trajan. The contrast is indeed great, but the man who fought so bravely against the Roman Republic, and the man who spread the boundaries of the Empire to their greatest extent were both natives of Hispania.

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REVIEWS

Hesiods Theogonie, mit Einleitung und kurzem Kommentar versehen von Wolf Aly (Kommentierte Griechische und Lateinische Texte herausgegeben von J. Geffcken). Heidelberg: Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung (1913). Pp. xxiv + 69.

This little book is an interesting and well constructed edition of an important document which has been unduly neglected because it does not conform to the aesthetic standards of our times.

The kernel of the book, pages 5-64, is the text itself, occupying about half the page, with a compact, well selected critical apparatus beneath it, and below that the exegetical commentary, devoted chiefly to mythological matters. This is preceded by a Γένος 'Ἡσιόδου,

1-4, derived from Plutarch's commentary, and followed, 65-69, by parallel texts: Apollodorus, Bibl. 1. 1-2. 1 (which is an outline of the 'Cyclic' Titanomachia), fragments of the Cyclic Titanomachia, and fragments of Pherekydes of Syros. The whole is preceded by a brief but clearly written Introduction, i-xix, dealing with Hesiod's personality and date, the date of the poems attributed to him, the extant poems, the ancient editions of Hesiod, the Byzantine manuscripts, the editions, the scholia, an analysis of the Theogony, its genesis, its place among Greek works of this class, and giving a selected bibliography.

The text is based avowedly on that of Rzach, with improvement of its orthography. The author, however, has examined at least two manuscripts himself, and it is evident that the textual problems have been subjected to a fresh and careful consideration.

It is always interesting to observe the progress in the constitution of a text. To show the ground gained in three and a half decades, I have compared Aly's text of verses 1-115 with that in Flach's Teubner edition (1877, reprinted 1891), and have noted the following differences. The orthography is improved in 15 (γαῖῃχον, not γεῖχον), and in 109 (θύλων, not θύων). The normal inflection is restored in 112 (ἄφενος, not ἄφενον) by following the consensus of the MSS, not one (Δ), for which preeminence had been claimed. The neglect of the digamma is accepted in 82 (τ' εἰδῶσαι, not τε ἰδῶσαι), as an attested fact on the authority of the MSS, against the indirect tradition. The discovery of the Paris papyrus has in four lines either given the correct reading, or turned the scales in its favor¹: 87 αἰψά κε, not αἰψ' ὄγε (codd. αἰψά τε); 93 τοῖη, not οἰά τε (codd.); 94 ἐκ γὰρ τοι Μουσέων, not ἐκ γὰρ Μουσάων (so Hom. Hymn 25.2, codd. ἐκ γὰρ τοι Μουσάων); 102 δυσφροσυνέων (so also Frg. Par., Δ), not δυσφρονέων (so or -άων, codd.). But three passages remain. In 5, where the ancient authorities were divided, Aly reads Τερμυσσοῖο with the codd., not Περμυσσοῖο, the Boeotian form. In 31 Flach read, with the MSS, μοι αὐδῆν; Aly adopts μ' ἀοιδῆν, Rzach's certain conjecture. In 38, following Schoemann, Aly changes ελπεύσαι to ελπουσαι, in my opinion unnecessarily. In Od. 23.16 ἐλέουσα is clearly used as a present—the interpretation of Ameis-Hentze-Cauer, 'um zu reden', is syntactically impossible in Homer (compare my dissertation, The Participle in Hesiod, 437 ff.)—and there too ελπουσα (also ελπούσα) has been conjectured. The contracted form of the plural with metrical lengthening at the beginning of the verse is what is read by the MSS and glossed by Hesychius: ἐλπεύσαι, λέγουσαι. Veitch also cites examples of ἐλέω as a present from late epic poets, and it is likely that they had additional warrant in poems no longer extant².

In one orthographical detail Aly has followed a

¹This is of interest in estimating the value of papyrus discoveries. It may also be noted that the truth had previously been conjectured in the first three passages.

²May not ἐλέω, in Od. 2. 162, 11. 137, 13. 7, always in the sixth foot and preceded by hiatus, be simply ἐρῶ with metrical lengthening?